**I affirm. Advantage one is Latin American Relations.** Strong gun control measures are key to Latin-American Relations, and the brink is now. Sweig 13[[1]](#footnote--1)

U.S. allies have repeatedly urged the United States to reinstate the federal assault-weapons ban and take action against weapons trafficking. Their patience—and the United States' credibility as a responsible partner—is waning. U.S. action will strengthen those regional heads of state who want to work with the United States and who also regard lax U.S. gun laws as fueling violence and anti-Americanism among their own publics. Across the board, Latin American governments are turning toward the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States and the Union of South American Nations, which pointedly exclude the United States, to handle regional political and security dilemmas. Stronger action to regulate the southward flow of weapons represents an opportunity for the Obama administration to enhance U.S. relevance in the region, especially at the early stages of new regional institutions and security protocols. Recommendations In the absence of major legislative action, the Obama administration should pursue the following executive and diplomatic actions—consistent with the Second Amendment—to reduce the trafficking of firearms that contribute to crime and violence across the Americas: Expand nationwide the state-level multiple-sale reporting requirement for assault weapons. In 2011, the Obama administration adopted a federal rule that requires gun dealers in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico to report sales of more than two semiautomatic rifles to the same person within a five-day period. Unintentionally, the rule shifted gun sales to states not covered by the requirement, prompting the need for improved oversight of all suspicious semiautomatic firearm sales. Incorporate strategies to reduce existing stocks of illegal firearms into U.S.-Brazil dialogue on defense and security. As home to the two largest firearms industries in the hemisphere, the United States and Brazil have a mutual interest in incorporating this topic into their ongoing bilateral policy dialogues. For example, sharing best practices regarding gun buyback programs in border regions on the U.S.-Mexican and Brazilian-Bolivian borders will build mutual confidence between the two largest Hemispheric powers. Exclude firearms and ammunition products from the Export Control Reform Initiative. As currently crafted, President Barack Obama's reform initiative may make it easier for U.S. manufacturers to export military-style weapons to allies. Liberalizing export restrictions on firearms poses a serious security risk to the Americas; potential reexport of firearms without U.S. oversight could jeopardize local law enforcement efforts to keep weapons from criminal groups and rogue security forces in the region. Apply the "sporting test" standards of the 1968 Gun Control Act. This provision prohibits the import of weapons not "suitable or readily adaptable for sporting purposes," including but not limited to military-style firearms. Throughout the 1990s, under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the ATF adhered to the sporting test guidelines, preventing thousands of assault weapons from entering the U.S. firearms market. Enforcement of the test lapsed under President George W. Bush and has not been reestablished under President Obama. Continue to support federal, state, and local initiatives to improve regulation of the U.S. civilian firearms market. As grassroots organizations prepare their long-term legislative strategies, the White House should back state and local legislation, based on reforms in Maryland and Connecticut, which bans the sale of assault rifles and high-capacity magazines, broadens existing background check requirements for firearm purchases, and modernizes gun-owner registries by requiring, among others, that buyers submit their fingerprints when applying for a gun license. While piecemeal regulation of the U.S. civilian firearms market does not represent a comprehensive solution, passage of state and local measures, including gun buyback programs, will reduce the number of weapons in circulation and available for smuggling and generate momentum for a broader federal approach over the long run. Conclusion Strengthening U.S. gun laws will not eliminate gun violence in Latin America, where weak judiciaries and police forces, the proliferation of gangs and black markets, and deep inequality exacerbate violent conflict. Nonetheless, lax U.S. gun regulations do enable international trafficking. While the effects of tighter regulation will not be felt overnight, such steps will offset widespread regional views that the United States remains indifferent to its own role in exacerbating one of Latin America's most significant challenges. Although recent federal gun control measures have run aground on congressional opposition, the Obama administration retains considerable leeway in the foreign policy arena, where concerted action can help U.S. allies in Latin America make the case to their constituents and to other skeptical governments that the United States can be a legitimate partner in combating transnational crime. At a juncture in U.S.-Latin American relations that again features both tension and opportunity, these actions will demonstrate that the United States is prepared, if imperfectly, to fulfill its shared responsibility for regional security and enhance American standing and positive influence in Latin America

Latin American relations are key to prevent economic collapse, climate change and prolif. **Shifter 12**[[2]](#footnote-0)

**There are compelling reasons for the U**nited **S**tates **and Latin America to pursue more robust ties. Every country** in the Americas **would benefit from strengthened and expanded economic relations, with improved access to each other’s markets, investment capital, and energy resources.** Even with its current economic problems, **the United States’ $16-trillion economy is a vital market and source of capital (including remittances) and technology for Latin America, and it could contribute more to the region’s economic performance**. For its part, **Latin America’s rising economies will inevitably become more and more crucial to the United States’ economic future. The U**nited **S**tates and many nations of Latin America and the Caribbean **would** also **gain a great deal by more cooperation on such global matters as climate change**, nuclear non-**prolif**eration, **and democracy and human rights.** With a rapidly expanding US Hispanic population of more than 50 million, the cultural and demographic integration of the United States and Latin America is proceeding at an accelerating pace, setting a firmer basis for hemispheric partnership Despite the multiple opportunities and potential benefits, **relations** between the United States and Latin America **remain disappointing . If new opportunities are not seized, relations will likely continue to drift apart** **. The longer the current situation persists, the harder it will be to reverse course and rebuild vigorous cooperation . Hemispheric affairs require urgent attention**—both from the United States

Economic decline causes global nuclear war---my impact has a strong statistical basis **Royal 10[[3]](#footnote-1)**

Less intuitive is how periods of **economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict**. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that **rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next**. As such, **exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power** (see also Gilpin. 1981) **that leads to uncertainty** about power balances, **increasing the risk of miscalc**ulation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, **even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict** as **a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power** (Werner. 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that **'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states**. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, **if the expectations of future trade decline**, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, **the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will** be inclined to **use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could** potentially be the **trigger** for **decreased trade expectations** either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, **others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess** (2002) **find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn.** They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the **presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other.** (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. p. 89) **Economic decline has** also **been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism** (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. **"Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect.** Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that **the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states** than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that **periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force**.

Prolif causes extinction Wesley 5**[[4]](#footnote-2)**

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes **opaque proliferation** the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It **breeds miscalculation—both overestimation of a state's nuclear weapons development** (as shown by the case of Iraq), **and underestimation** (in the case of Libya)—**that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves**. **Even more dangerous**, argues Lewis Dunn, **is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop** weak failsafe mechanisms **and nuclear** doctrine that is destabilising**: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs**, **less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear** weapon deployments or **use**. **The necessary exercises cannot be conducted**, **nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised**, **nor alert procedures tested**. **As a result**, **the risk of accidents or incidents may** rise greatly **in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict**. **Miscalculations by neighbours or outsiders also appear** more likely, **given their** uncertainties about the adversary's capabilities, **as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent** (1991: 20, italics in original). And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, **some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components**, **materials and knowledge**. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), **such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price**, **criminals or other facilitators could pass** nuclear materials to terrorist groups **or extortionists** (Albright and Hinderstein 2005). Both through its inadequacies and its obsessive focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the ultimate nightmare: terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons.

#### Warming causes extinction. **Roberts 13**[[5]](#footnote-3)

We know we’ve raised global average temperatures around 0.8 degrees C so far. We know that 2 degrees C is where most scientists predict catastrophic and irreversible impacts. And we know that we are currently on a trajectory that will push temperatures up 4 degrees or more by the end of the century. What would 4 degrees look like? A recent [World Bank review of the science](http://climatechange.worldbank.org/) reminds us. First, it’ll get hot: Projections for a 4°C world show a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency of high-temperature extremes. Recent extreme heat waves such as in Russia in 2010 are likely to become the new normal summer in a 4°C world. Tropical South America, central Africa, and all tropical islands in the Pacific are likely to regularly experience heat waves of unprecedented magnitude and duration. In this new high-temperature climate regime, the coolest months are likely to be substantially warmer than the warmest months at the end of the 20th century. In regions such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Tibetan plateau, almost all summer months are likely to be warmer than the most extreme heat waves presently experienced. For example, the warmest July in the Mediterranean region could be 9°C warmer than today’s warmest July. Extreme heat waves in recent years have had severe impacts, causing heat-related deaths, forest fires, and harvest losses. The impacts of the extreme heat waves projected for a 4°C world have not been evaluated, but they could be expected to vastly exceed the consequences experienced to date and potentially exceed the adaptive capacities of many societies and natural systems. [my emphasis] Warming to 4 degrees would also lead to “an increase of about 150 percent in acidity of the ocean,” leading to levels of acidity “unparalleled in Earth’s history.” That’s bad news for, say, coral reefs: The combination of thermally induced bleaching events, ocean acidification, and sea-level rise threatens large fractions of coral reefs even at 1.5°C global warming. The regional extinction of entire coral reef ecosystems, which could occur well before 4°C is reached, would have profound consequences for their dependent species and for the people who depend on them for food, income, tourism, and shoreline protection. It will also “likely lead to a sea-level rise of 0.5 to 1 meter, and possibly more, by 2100, with several meters more to be realized in the coming centuries.” That rise won’t be spread evenly, even within regions and countries — regions close to the equator will see even higher seas. There are also indications that it would “significantly exacerbate existing water scarcity in many regions, particularly northern and eastern Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, while additional countries in Africa would be newly confronted with water scarcity on a national scale due to population growth.” Also, more extreme weather events: Ecosystems will be affected by more frequent extreme weather events, such as forest loss due to droughts and wildfire exacerbated by land use and agricultural expansion. In Amazonia, forest fires could as much as double by 2050 with warming of approximately 1.5°C to 2°C above preindustrial levels. Changes would be expected to be even more severe in a 4°C world. Also loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services: In a 4°C world, climate change seems likely to become the dominant driver of ecosystem shifts, surpassing habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Recent research suggests that large-scale loss of biodiversity is likely to occur in a 4°C world, with climate change and high CO2 concentration driving a transition of the Earth’s ecosystems into a state unknown in human experience. Ecosystem damage would be expected to dramatically reduce the provision of ecosystem services on which society depends (for example, fisheries and protection of coastline afforded by coral reefs and mangroves.) New research also indicates a “rapidly rising risk of crop yield reductions as the world warms.” So food will be tough. All this will add up to “large-scale displacement of populations and have adverse consequences for human security and economic and trade systems.” Given the uncertainties and long-tail risks involved, “there is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible.” There’s a small but non-trivial chance of advanced civilization breaking down entirely. Now ponder the fact that some scenarios show us going up to 6degrees by the end of the century, a level of devastation we have not studied and barely know how to conceive. Ponder the fact that somewhere along the line, though we don’t know exactly where, enough self-reinforcing feedback loops will be running to make climate change unstoppable and irreversible for centuries to come. That would mean handing our grandchildren and their grandchildren not only a burned, chaotic, denuded world, but a world that is inexorably more inhospitable with every passing decade.

**Advantage two is Cartels:** Cartel violence is **escalating** and causing **massive instability** in Mexico. Saenz **15[[6]](#footnote-4)**

It comes at a crucial time, as Mexico seems to be sinking into an even more severe political and economic crisis: the peso keeps falling while disappearances and assassinations keep rising. the peso keeps falling[6] while disappearances[7] and assassinations[8] keep rising. Meanwhile civilian social protests are violently repressed by the state, while a daily theater of death is delivered by the various drug cartels terrorizing the nation with uncountable disappearances, beheadings and hanging corpses. Such gruesome spectacles are meant to intimidate the populace into fearful denial, complacency and silence. Official estimates state that over 100,000 people have been killed and approximately 25,000 disappeared since former President Calderon declared war on the drug lords in 2006. Many believe the actual numbers are much higher. The Ayotzinapa case confirmed the suspected link between murderous drug cartels and the governments of ruling political parties as both municipal police and federal army were involved in detaining the student-teachers that fateful 26th of September, resulting in 3 dead and 43 disappeared. The federal government has completely failed to provide explanations for the army's role in the students' disappearance, denying access to the army barracks from where came the last signal of their cellular phones. The resulting outrage expressed on both a national as well as global scale accompanies and supports the determination and leadership of the disappeared students' colleagues and .family members trying to find out what happened to their loved ones. Their collective intelligence manifests in an ability to organize and act swiftly. They have formed various civilian caravans composed of parents, student, teachers, human rights workers and legal advisors to tour the north, south, and center of the country to meet with other families of the disappeared. Their hope is to make more visible their plight and connect with others like them, striking a deep chord with the Mexican public; they mirror the reality of an entire nation at the mercy of murderous cartels complicit with an inept government. The strength and persistence of what has now become a wide-reaching movement far surpasses that of a President and Attorney General who have merely tried to sweep the whole pesky affair under the proverbial rug. Not only has the Mexican federal government failed to provide plausible explanations or competent actions, they have not been able to even express credible empathy.

Small arms fuel Latin American and Mexican drug violence; US domestic sales are key. Sweig 13[[7]](#footnote-5)

With the launch of the Merida Initiative in 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to a regional security framework guided by the principle of shared responsibility. Among its domestic obligations, the United States committed to intensify its efforts to combat the illegal trafficking of weapons and ammunition to Mexico and elsewhere in the Americas. Six years later, little has changed: the U.S. civilian firearms market continues to supply the region's transnational criminal networks with high-powered weaponry that is purchased with limited oversight, especially from unlicensed individuals at gun shows, flea markets, pawn shops, and on the Internet. Lax U.S. gun laws enable straw purchasers, including those under investigation in Operation Fast and Furious, to legally procure thousands of AK-47 and AR-15 variants every year **and traffic** them **across the border to sell** them illegally **to criminal factions**. U.S. government data highlights the problem. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives' (ATF) Web-based firearm trace request and analysis system, eTrace, enables law enforcement officials to collaborate with ATF to track the path of recovered weapons from the manufacturer or importer though the distribution chain to the first retail purchase. Over 70 percent of the ninety-nine thousand weapons recovered by Mexican law enforcement since 2007 were traced to U.S. manufacturers and importers. Likewise, 2011 eTrace data for the Caribbean indicates that over 90 percent of the weapons recovered and traced in the Bahamas and over 80 percent of those in Jamaica came from the United States. The ATF has not released data for Central America, but the numbers are likely similar. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime reports that easy access to firearms is a major factor influencing homicide trends in Latin America and the Caribbean; the gun-related homicide rate in Latin America exceeded the global average in 2010 by more than 30 percent. The World Bank estimates that crime and violence cost Central America nearly 8 percent of its GDP when accounting for the costs of law enforcement, security, and health care. The U.S. government has empowered law enforcement in the region to recover and investigate the source of weapons used by criminal factions. In December 2009, the ATF introduced the Spanish version of eTrace. Since 2012, the State Department has funded the Organization of American States' (OAS) program to provide firearm-marking equipment and training to law enforcement in twenty-five countries. Yet, these efforts notwithstanding, Mexican authorities intercepted only 12.7 percent of the roughly 250,000 guns smuggled into Mexico between 2010 and 2012, while the ATF intercepted no more than 2 percent. In effect, the United States undermines its own efforts at preventing arms trafficking with its unwillingness to strengthen oversight of the firearms industry and lukewarm support for multilateral agreements

And, handguns are the most commonly used weapons in recent cartel violence **PW 15[[8]](#footnote-6)**

Anybody can find copious amount of stories about smuggling drugs and items into the United States from Mexico, but what smuggling the other way around? It is a little known fact that smuggling items INTO Mexico is just as common and profitable as smuggling vice versa, the only difference is WHAT is being smuggled. While drugs are the major import into the United States, conversely, **guns are the import of choice into Mexico**. In fact **over 90% of guns seized from Mexican Cartels have been found to be from the United States**. The traffic is reflected in the disproportionately high number of federally licensed firearms dealers along the U.S. side of the border. Of the 51,300 retail gun shops in the United States that hold federal licenses, some 6,700 of them are concentrated in the four U.S. states that border Mexico. On average, there are more than three gun dealers for every mile of the 1,970-mile border between the countries. **US influence over gun availability in Mexico can even be reflected by the type of guns that are currently being used in Mexico**. **Increasingly** **more and more killings in Mexico are carried out with handguns**, not the high-powered assault weapons that garner much of the attention related to the countries violence. **In fact the vast majority of deaths** arising from Violence in Mexico **can be attributed to .38 caliber handguns**, it just so happens that **the United States is the largest market for .38 Caliber handguns**. Our story picks up at the San Ysidro Border Entry near San Diego, CA. Our author is an ex Mexican Cartel member who is retired and now lives on a remote ranch on the very far east of San Diego. Due to the highly controversial content of this article and at his request, we will refer to him as “Mr Red” to maintain his anonymity. When we received contact from Mr. Red and started to hear his story, we just naturally assumed he was Mexican. Upon meeting Mr. Red we were astonished to find out that he was a white American man with a heavy Mexican accent, who spoke fluent Spanish, and was born into a middle class family in sunny La Jolla, CA

American gun control solves arms trafficking – strict Mexican gun laws fail absent the plan. **Mehalko 12[[9]](#footnote-7)**

**Arms trafficking is unlikely to decrease without increased cooperation between the United States and Mexico**.13 Although regulations restricting trafficking are likely constitutional, cultural factors in the southwestern states make domestic reform, tightening restrictions on firearms sales, unlikely.14 One commentator suggested that lax regulations in Texas and Arizona “reflect both the libertarian traditions of the West and the anxious vigilance of firearms enthusiasts toward their Second Amendment rights.”15 State gun control laws impose few restrictions on firearms sales, making prosecution of those accused of transacting with Mexican cartels more difficult.16 Further, state laws creating an individual right to bear arms now find support in the federal SecondAmendment policy that was incorporated to the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago.17  **Despite Mexican attempts to regulate the illicit arms trade,18 arms trafficking has proliferated**, operating either in accordance with gun control regulations or outside the reach of government action.19 **Mexico is known for its** particularly **strict gun control laws** and has only one operating gun store in the country.20 **Yet**, between 2004 and 2008, the government seized nearly five times as many firearms from drug crimes as there are legal permits.21 **Government efforts to restrict access to firearms have thus proven ineffective in the drug war**.22  This rise in international crime, or “crime that crosses international borders,”23 has not been met with a coherent international effort intended to reduce access to high powered weapons by the DTOs.24 **Under the current legal framework, it is likely that arms trafficking will continue, and any attempt** by Mexico **to reduce the illicit arms trade** and related violence **will be undermined by U.S. policy**.25

#### Mexico instability undermines U.S. leadership and risks global arms races. Haddick 10[[10]](#footnote-8)

Most significantly, a strengthening Mexican insurgency would very likely affect America's role in the rest of the world. An increasingly chaotic American side of the border, marked by bloody cartel wars, corrupted government and media, and a breakdown in security, would likely cause many in the United States to question the importance of military and foreign policy ventures elsewhere in the world. Should the southern border become a U.S. president's primary national security concern, nervous allies and opportunistic adversaries elsewhere in the world would no doubt adjust to a distracted and inward-looking America, with potentially disruptive arms races the result. Secretary Clinton has looked south and now sees an insurgency. Let's hope that the United States can apply what it has recently learned about insurgencies to stop this one from getting out of control.

Heg decline causes nuclear war. Metz 13**[[11]](#footnote-9)**

So much for the regions of modest concern. The Middle East/North Africa region, by contrast, is a part of the world where American retrenchment or narrowing U.S. military capabilities could have extensive adverse effects. While the region has a number of nations with significant military capability, it does not have a functioning method for preserving order without outside involvement. As U.S. power recedes, it could turn out that American involvement was in fact a deterrent against Iran taking a more adventurous regional posture, for instance. With the United States gone, Tehran could become more aggressive, propelling the Middle East toward division into hostile Shiite and Sunni blocs and encouraging the spread of nuclear weapons. With fewer ties between regional armed forces and the United States, there also could be a new round of military coups. States of the region could increase pressure on Israel, possibly leading to pre-emptive military strikes by the Israelis, with a risk of another major war. One of the al-Qaida affiliates might seize control of a state or exercise outright control of at least part of a collapsed state. Or China might see American withdrawal as an opportunity to play a greater role in the region, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The United States has a number of security objectives in the Middle East and North Africa: protecting world access to the region's petroleum, limiting humanitarian disasters, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, limiting the operating space for al-Qaida and its affiliates, sustaining America's commitment to long-standing partners and assuring Israel's security. Arguments that the U.S. can disengage from the region and recoup savings in defense expenditures assume that petroleum exports would continue even in the event of domination of the region by a hostile power like Iran or a competitor like China, state collapse or even the seizure of power by extremists. Whoever exercises power in the region would need to sell oil. And the United States is moving toward petroleum self-sufficiency or, at least, away from dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But even if the United States could get along with diminished petroleum exports from the Middle East, many other nations couldn't. The economic damage would cascade, inevitably affecting the United States. Clearly disengagement from the Middle East and North Africa would entail significant risks for the United States. It would be a roll of the strategic dice. South and Central Asia are a bit different, since large-scale U.S. involvement there is a relatively recent phenomenon. This means that the regional security architecture there is less dependent on the United States than that of some other regions. South and Central Asia also includes two vibrant, competitive and nuclear-armed powers—India and China—as well as one of the world's most fragile nuclear states, Pakistan. Writers like Robert Kaplan argue that South Asia's importance will continue to grow, its future shaped by the competition between China and India. This makes America's security partnership with India crucial. The key issue is whether India can continue to modernize its military to balance China while addressing its immense domestic problems with infrastructure, education, income inequality and ethnic and religious tensions. If it cannot, the United States might have to decide between ceding domination of the region to China or spending what it takes to sustain an American military presence in the region. Central Asia is different. After a decade of U.S. military operations, the region remains a cauldron of extremism and terrorism. America's future role there is in doubt, as it looks like the United States will not be able to sustain a working security partnership with Afghanistan and Pakistan in the future. At some point one or both of these states could collapse, with extremist movements gaining control. There is little chance of another large-scale U.S. military intervention to forestall state collapse, but Washington might feel compelled to act to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons if Islamabad loses control of them. The key decision for Washington might someday be whether to tolerate extremist-dominated areas or states as long as they do not enable transnational terrorism. Could the United States allow a Taliban state in parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for instance, if it did not provide training areas and other support to al-Qaida? Most likely, the U.S. approach would be to launch raids and long-distance attacks on discernible al-Qaida targets and hope that such a method best balanced costs and risks. The Asia-Pacific region will remain the most important one to the United States even in a time of receding American power. The United States retains deep economic interests in and massive trade with Asia, and has been a central player in the region's security system for more than a century. While instability or conflict there is less likely than in the Middle East and North Africa, if it happened it would be much more dangerous because of the economic and military power of the states likely to be involved. U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific has been described as a hub-and-spokes strategy "with the United States as the hub, bilateral alliances as the spokes and multilateral institutions largely at the margins." In particular, the bilateral "spokes" are U.S. security ties with key allies Australia, Japan and South Korea and, in a way, Taiwan. The United States also has many other beneficial security relationships in the region, including with Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. America's major security objectives in the Asia-Pacific in recent years have been to discourage Chinese provocation or destabilization as China rises in political, economic and military power, and to prevent the world's most bizarre and unpredictable nuclear power—North Korea—from unleashing Armageddon through some sort of miscalculation. Because the U.S. plays a more central role in the Asia-Pacific security framework than in any other regional security arrangement, this is the region where disengagement or a recession of American power would have the most far-reaching effect. Without an American counterweight, China might become increasingly aggressive and provocative. This could lead the other leading powers of the region close to China—particularly Japan, South Korea and Taiwan—to abandon their historical antagonism toward one another and move toward some sort of de facto or even formal alliance. If China pushed them too hard, all three have the technological capability to develop and deploy nuclear weapons quickly. The middle powers of the region, particularly those embroiled in disputes with China over the resources of the South China Sea, would have to decide between acceding to Beijing's demands or aligning themselves with the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan bloc. Clearly North Korea will remain the most incendiary element of the Asia-Pacific system even if the United States opts to downgrade its involvement in regional security. The parasitic Kim dynasty cannot survive forever. The question is whether it lashes out in its death throes, potentially with nuclear weapons, or implodes into internal conflict. Either action would require a significant multinational effort, whether to invade then reconstruct and stabilize the nation, or for humanitarian relief and peacekeeping following a civil war. Even if the United States were less involved in the region, it would probably participate in such an effort, but might not lead it. Across all these regions, four types of security threats are plausible and dangerous: protracted internal conflicts that cause humanitarian disasters and provide operating space for extremists (the Syria model); the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; the seizure of a state or part of a state by extremists that then use the territory they control to support transnational terrorism; and the old specter of major war between nations. U.S. political leaders and security experts once believed that maintaining a full range of military capabilities, including the ability to undertake large-scale, protracted land operations, was an important deterrent to potential opponents. But the problem with deterrence is that it's impossible to prove. Did the U.S. military deter the Soviet seizure of Western Europe, or did Moscow never intend to do that irrespective of what the United States did? Unfortunately, the only way to definitively demonstrate the value of deterrence is to allow U.S. power to recede and see if bad things happen. Until recently, the United States was not inclined to take such a risk. But now there is increasing political support for accepting greater risk by moving toward a cheaper military without a full range of capabilities. Many Americans are willing to throw the strategic dice. The recession of American power will influence the evolution of the various regional security systems, of which history suggests there are three types: hegemonic security systems in which a dominant state assures stability; balance of power systems where rivals compete but do not dominate; and cooperative systems in which multiple states inside and sometimes outside a region maintain security and limit or contain conflict. Sub-Saharan Africa is a weak cooperative system organized around the African Union. Even if there is diminished U.S. involvement, the sub-Saharan African security system is likely to remain as it is. Latin America might have once been a hegemonic system, at least in the Caribbean Basin, but today it is moving toward becoming a cooperative system with a diminished U.S. role. The same is true of Europe. The Middle East/North Africa region, South and Central Asia and the Asia-Pacific will probably move toward becoming balance of power systems with less U.S. involvement. Balances of power can prevent major wars with adept diplomacy and when the costs of conflict are high, as in Europe during the Cold War, for instance. But catastrophic conflicts can happen if the balance collapses, as in Europe in the summer of 1914. Power balances work best when one key state is able to shift sides to preserve the balance, but there is no candidate to play this role in the emerging power balances in these three regions. Hence the balances in these regions will be dangerously unstable.

#### 2,000 years of history prove heg solves war. **Sempa 11**[[12]](#footnote-10)

Forget Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Machiavelli. Put aside Mackinder, Mahan, and Spykman. Close the military academies and war colleges. Shut our overseas bases. Bring our troops home. Make dramatic cuts in the defense budget. The end of major war, and perhaps the end of war itself, is near, according to Tulane assistant professor Christopher Fettweis in his recent book, Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace. Fettweis is not the first intellectual, nor will he be the last, to proclaim the onset of perpetual peace. He is squarely in the tradition of Immanuel Kant, Herbert Spencer, and Norman Angell, to name just three. Indeed, in the book’s introduction, Fettweis attempts to rehabilitate Angell’s reputation for prophecy, which suffered a devastating blow when the Great War falsified his claim in The Great Illusion that economic interdependence had rendered great power war obsolete. Angell, Fettweis writes, was the first “prominent constructivist thinker of the twentieth century,” and was not wrong—just ahead of his time (p. 5). Fettweis bases his theory or vision of the obsolescence of major war on the supposed linear progress of human nature, a major tenet of 20th-century liberalism that is rooted in the rationalist theories of the Enlightenment. “History,” according to Fettweis, “seems to be unfolding as a line extending into the future—a halting, incomplete, inconsistent line perhaps, one with frequent temporary reversals, but a line nonetheless.” The world is growing “more liberal and more reliant upon reason, logic, and science” (p. 217). We have heard this all before. Human nature can be perfected. Statesmen and leaders will be guided by reason and science. Such thinking influenced the visionaries of the French Revolution and produced 25 years of war among the great powers of Europe. Similar ideas influenced President Woodrow Wilson and his intellectual supporters who endeavored at Versailles to transform the horrors of World War I into a peace that would make that conflict “the war to end all wars.” What followed were disarmament conferences, an international agreement to outlaw war, the rise of expansionist powers, appeasement by the democracies, and the most destructive war in human history. Ideas, which Fettweis claims will bring about the proliferation of peace, transformed Russia, Germany, and Japan into expansionist, totalitarian powers. Those same ideas led to the Gulag, the Holocaust, and the Rape of Nanking. So much for human progress. Fettweis knows all of this, but claims that since the end of the Cold War, the leaders and peoples of the major powers, except the United States, have accepted the idea that major war is unthinkable. His proof is that there has been no major war among the great powers for 20 years—a historical period that coincides with the American “unipolar” moment. This is very thin empirical evidence upon which to base a predictive theory of international relations. Fettweis criticizes the realist and neorealist schools of thought, claiming that their adherents focus too narrowly on the past behavior of states in the international system. In his view, realists place too great an emphasis on power. Ideas and norms instead of power, he claims, provide structure to the international system. Classical geopolitical theorists such as Halford Mackinder, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Nicholas Spykman, and Colin Gray are dismissed by Fettweis in less than two pages, despite the fact that their analyses of great power politics and conflict have long been considered sound and frequently prescient. Realists and classical geopoliticians have more than 2,000 years of empirical evidence to support their theories of how states and empires behave and how the international system works. Ideas are important, but power is the governing force in international politics, and geography is the most permanent factor in the analysis of power. Fettweis makes much of the fact that the countries of Western and Central Europe, which waged war against each other repeatedly for nearly 400 years, are at peace, and claims that there is little likelihood that they will ever again wage war against each other. Even if the latter assertion turns out to be true, that does not mean that the end of major war is in sight. Throughout history, some peoples and empires that previously waged war for one reason or another became pacific without producing worldwide perpetual peace: the Mongols, Saracens, Ottomans, Dutch, Venetians, and the Spanish Empire come immediately to mind. A Europe at peace does not translate to an Asia, Africa, and Middle East at peace. In a world in which major wars are obsolete, Fettweis believes the United States needs to adjust its grand strategy from vigorous internationalism to strategic restraint. His specific recommendations include the removal of all U.S. military forces from Europe; an end to our bilateral security guarantees to Japan and South Korea; an end to our alliance with Israel; an indifference to the balance of power on the Eurasian landmass; a law enforcement approach to terrorism; a drastic cut in military spending; a much smaller Navy; and the abolition of regional combatant commands. What Fettweis is proposing is effectively an end to what Walter Russell Mead calls “the maritime world order” that was established by Great Britain and maintained first by the British Empire and then by the United States. It is a world order that has defeated repeated challenges by potential hegemonic powers and resulted in an unprecedented spread of prosperity and freedom. But all of that, we are assured, is in the past. China poses no threat. The United States can safely withdraw from Eurasia. The power vacuum will remain unfilled. Fettweis needs a dose of humility. Sir Halford Mackinder, the greatest of all geopoliticians, was referring to visionaries and liberal idealists like Fettweis when he cautioned, “He would be a sanguine man . . . who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the mentality of any nation.” Most profoundly, General Douglas MacArthur, who knew a little bit more about war and international conflict than Fettweis, reminded the cadets at West Point in 1962 that “only the dead have seen the end of war.”

#### Strong Mexican cartels facilitate WMD terror attacks in the US—the threat is significant and underestimated. Webster 15[[13]](#footnote-11)

The spread of Mexican Drug Cartels (MDC's) and other criminal organizations in Mexico and other Central and South American countries are beginning to join forces with terrorist groups like ISIS.¶ Together they are tearing at the social, economic, and security fabric of our neighbors to the south. Powerful MDC's are well resourced; these groups traffic in drugs and humans. This includes smuggling into the U.S. heroin, cocaine, marijuana, counterfeit pharmaceuticals, methamphetamine – small arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, illegally mined gold, counterfeit goods, humans, and dangerous terrorists and contraband.¶ They engage in money laundering using many American banks, bribery of officials from both Mexico and the U.S., intimidation and threats to business owners and individuals and bloody assassinations which include beheadings every bit as horrible as the recently depicted murders of innocent journalist and christens seen on worldwide TV by ISIS . They threaten the very underpinnings of democracy itself: citizen safety, rule of law, and economic prosperity. And they pose a direct threat to the stability of our partners and an insidious risk to the security of our nation.¶ While there is growing recognition of the danger posed by transnational organized crime, it is often eclipsed by other concerns.¶ According to General JOHN F. KELLY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS COMMANDER of the UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND, who spoke before the 114th CONGRESS SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, "I believe we are overlooking a significant security threat."¶ Criminal organizations are constantly adapting their methods for trafficking across our borders. There are reports from intel sources around the world who believe that there are clear indications that the criminal networks involved in human and drug trafficking are interested in supporting the efforts of terrorist groups, these networks could unwittingly, or even wittingly, facilitate the movement of terrorist operatives or weapons of mass destruction toward our borders. Potentially undetected and almost completely unrestricted. Some experts and American officials think some WMD's are already within our borders.¶ General Kelly reports that the drug trade – which is exacerbated by U.S. drug consumption – has wrought devastating consequences in many of our partner nations, degrading their civilian police and justice systems, corrupting their institutions, and contributing to a breakdown in citizen safety.¶ The general points out that the tentacles of global networks involved in narcotics and arms trafficking, human smuggling, illicit finance, and other types of illegal activity reach across Latin America and the Caribbean and into the United States, yet we continue to underestimate the threat of transnational organized crime at significant and direct risk to our national security and that of our partner nations. Unless confronted by an immediate, visible, or uncomfortable crisis, our nation's tendency is to take the security of the Western Hemisphere for granted. I believe this is a mistake.¶ In addition to thousands of Central Americans fleeing poverty and violence, foreign nationals from the Middle East including countries like Somalia, Bangladesh, Lebanon, and Pakistan are using the region's human smuggling networks to enter the United States.¶ While many are merely seeking economic opportunity or fleeing war, others are seeking to do us harm. Last year, ISIS adherents posted discussions on social media calling for the infiltration of the U.S. southern border.¶ The Texas Department of Public Safety, 2013 Threat Assessment Spotlighted that the Economic Citizenship Programs provides a quick path for foreign nationals to acquire citizenship. Of concern, these "cash for passport" programs could be exploited by criminals, terrorists, or other nefarious actors to obtain freedom of movement, facilitate entry into the U.S., or launder illicitly gained funds.¶ Last year, almost half a million migrants from Central America and Mexico – including over 50,000 unaccompanied children (UAC) and families – were apprehended on our border, many fleeing violence, poverty, and the spreading influence of criminal networks and gangs. Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jacobson testified that the "UAC migration serves as a warning sign that the serious and longstanding challenges in Central America are worsening." In my opinion, the relative ease with which human smugglers moved tens of thousands of people to our nation's doorstep also serves as another warning sign: these smuggling routes are a potential vulnerability to our homeland. As I stated last year, terrorist organizations could seek to leverage those same smuggling routes to move operatives with intent to cause grave harm to our citizens or even bring weapons of mass destruction into the United States."**¶** There appears to be financial and operational overlap between criminal and terrorist networks in the region. Terrorists and militant organizations are believed to be taping into the international illicit marketplace to underwrite their activities and obtain arms and funding to conduct operations to spread extreme Islam throughout the globe.

ISIS is a safe haven for complex terrorist plots – they’ve already stolen uranium and have nuclear ambitions. **IBD 14** [[14]](#footnote-12)

WMD: So the U.S. pulls out of Iraq and an al-Qaida-tied group moves in and gets hold of nuclear material. Maybe the "Bush lied" crowd should put some of that depleted uranium in their pipes and smoke it. Iraq's UN ambassador this week disclosed that **nearly 90 pounds of low-grade uranium compounds stored at a Mosul university was seized by Sunni terrorists who invaded last month**. **Whether the new al-Qaida-linked state in Syria and Iraq can build a dirty bomb from it, jihadists who want to plot a nuclear 9/11 now know where the action is.** The potential threat from theft was immediately downplayed in the media. But House Homeland Security counter-terrorism subcommittee chairman Peter King, R-N.Y., isn't convinced it's harmless. King told Fox News' Megyn Kelly, that despite "the fact that the government or the administration is trying to pass this off as not being enriched and perhaps not being weapons grade, the fact is it still could be used for a dirty bomb." **Indeed, this is truly a nightmare scenario.** President Obama sold the American people on the notion that he would bring peace to Iraq; that with Osama bin Laden dead, al-Qaida was on the run; and that Iraq and al-Qaida had nothing to do with one another. Now the Obama-engineered **power vacuum** in the Mideast **has brought the world possibly the greatest Islamist terrorist threat since 9/11: a new Shariah-law state dedicated to launching major acts of terrorism, with nuclear-weapon ambitions like al-Qaida, from which it splintered.** In his Pulitzer Prize-winning history of al-Qaida, "The Looming Tower," Lawrence Wright describes the lead-up to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, when -- after the attack on the U.S.S. Cole less than a year earlier -- "al-Qaida camps in Afghanistan filled with new recruits, and contributors from the Gulf states arrived carrying Samsonite suitcases filled with petrodollars, as in the glory days of the Afghan jihad." Wright chronicled how al-Qaida recruits attracted to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan were well-educated jihad seekers who saw where the base to be trained for successful operations was. Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard's Kennedy School and a senior nuclear weapons adviser to President Clinton, is alarmed. He says the new Iraq/Syria caliphate's theft of the uranium means that "Like the Taliban's Afghanistan before 9/11, the Islamic State may become a safe haven for people from other groups and countries to train and plot complex attacks." Bunn warned that the new Islamic State "has made clear that its ambitions are global." It has also declared itself to be the caliphate promised by Allah, through which "the sun of jihad has risen," explicitly inviting terrorists the world over to travel to Iraq and join them. Bunn warned: "**Having such a haven where the government is not going to interfere makes a huge difference in terrorists' ability to put together a really complicated plot** -- from something like 9/11 to a plot **to make a nuclear bomb**." **He's dead right. Iran and this new nightmarish state are now twin threats of eventual nuclear terrorism.**

Even a small-scale nuclear terrorist attack risks extinction. **Toon 7[[15]](#footnote-13)**

To an increasing extent, people are congregating in the world’s great urban centers, creating megacities with populations exceeding 10 million individuals. At the same time, advanced technology has designed **nuclear explosives** of such small size they can be easily transported in a car, small plane or boat to the heart of a city. We demonstrate here that a single detonation in the 15 kiloton range **can produce urban** fatalities approaching one million in some cases, and **casualties exceeding one million**. Thousands of small weapons still exist in the arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and there are at least six other countries with substantial nuclear weapons inventories. In all, thirty-three countries control sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium or plutonium to assemble nuclear explosives. A conflict between any of these countries involving 50-100 weapons with yields of 15 kt has the potential to create fatalities rivaling those of the Second World War. Moreover, even a single surface nuclear explosion, or an air burst in rainy conditions, in a city center is likely to cause the entire metropolitan area to be abandoned at least for decades owing to infrastructure damage and radioactive contamination. As the aftermath of hurricane Katrina in Louisiana suggests, the **economic consequences of even a localized nuclear catastrophe would** most likely **have severe** national and **international economic consequences**. Striking effects result even from relatively small nuclear attacks because low yield detonations are most effective against city centers where business and social activity as well as population are concentrated. Rogue nations and **terrorists would** be most likely to **strike there**. Accordingly, an organized **attack** on the U.S. by a small nuclear state, or terrorists supported by such a state, **could generate casualties comparable to** those once predicted for **a full-scale nuclear “counterforce” exchange in a superpower conflict**. Remarkably, the estimated **quantities of smoke** generated by attacks totaling about one megaton of nuclear explosives **could lead to** **significant global climate perturbations** (Robock et al., 2007). While we did not extend our casualty and damage predictions to include potential medical, social or economic impacts following the initial explosions, such analyses have been performed in the past for large-scale nuclear war scenarios (Harwell and Hutchinson, 1985). Such a study should be carried out as well for the present scenarios and physical outcomes.

**Part two is Framework:** The standard is Util, First, Human decision-making is governed by principles of biology and physics, denying the existence of free will and proving determinism. **Coyne 12**[[16]](#footnote-14)

The first is simple: **we are** biological creatures, collections of **molecules** that must obey the laws of physics. All the success of science rests on the regularity of those **laws**, which **determine the behavior of every molecule** in the universe. Those molecules, of course, also make up your brain — the organ that does the "choosing." And the neurons and molecules in your brain are the product of both your genes and your environment, an environment including the other people we deal with. Memories, for example, are nothing more than structural and chemical changes in your brain cells. **Everything that you** think, say, or **do, must come down to** molecules and **physics**. True "**free will**," then, **would require us to** somehow **step outside** of **our brain**’s structure and modify how it works. Science hasn't shown any way we can do this because**[but] "we" are** simply **constructs of our brain. [and] We can't impose a** nebulous **"will" on** the inputs to **our brain** that can affect its output of decisions and actions, **any more than a** programmed **computer can** somehow reach inside itself and **change its program**.

If determinism is true, the only coherent moral framework is utilitarianism, since it does not assign moral responsibility to the free will of individual actors, but instead simply evaluates the goodness or badness of overall states of affairs. **Greene and Cohen 04**[[17]](#footnote-15)

Even if there is no intuitively satisfying solution to the problem of free will, it does not follow that there is no correct view of the matter. Ours is as follows: when it comes to the issue of free will itself, hard determinism is mostly correct. **Free will**, as we ordinarily understand it, **is an illusion**. **However,** it does not follow from the fact that free will is an illusion that there is no legitimate [a] place for responsibility. Recall from x 2 that **there are** two general **justifications** **for holding people** legally **responsible** for their actions. The retributive justification, by which the goal of punishment is to give people what they really deserve, does depend[s] on this dubious notion of free will. However, **the consequentialist approach does not require** a belief in **free will** at all. As consequentialists, **we can hold people responsible** for crimes simply **because doing so has**, on balance, **beneficial effects** through deterrence, containment, etc. **It is** sometimes **said** that **if we do not believe in free will then we cannot legitimately punish anyone** and that society must dissolve into anarchy. In a less hysterical vein, Daniel Wegner argues that **[but] free will**, while illusory, **is a necessary fiction for the maintenance of our social structure** (Wegner 2002, ch. 9). We disagree. There are perfectly good, forward-looking justifications for

Second, Governments has a specific obligation to be utilitarian, **Woller 97**[[18]](#footnote-16)

Moreover, virtually all public policies entail some redistribution of economic or political resources, such that one group's gains must come at another group's ex- pense. Consequently,public**policies in a democracy must be justified to the public**, and especially to those who pay the costs of those policies. Such **[but] justification cannot** simply **be assumed** a priori **by** invoking some higher-order **moral principle**. Appeals to a priori moral principles, such as environmental preservation, also often fail to acknowledge that **public policies inevitably entail trade-offs** among competing values. Thus since policymakers cannot justify inherent value conflicts to the public in any philosophical sense, and **since public policies** inherently **imply winners and losers, the** **policymakers' duty [is]** to the public interest requires them **to demonstrate** that the redistributive effects and value trade-offs implied by **their polices are** somehow **to the** overall **advantage of society**. At the same time, deontologically based ethicalsystems have severe practical limitations as a basis for public policy. At best, [Also,] a priori moral principles provide only general guidance to ethical dilemmas in public affairs and do not themselves suggest appropriate public policies, and at worst, they create a regimen of regulatory unreasonableness while failing to adequately address the problem or actually making it worse

And, Act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states. **Sunstein and Vermuele 5**[[19]](#footnote-17)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

#### Also if there in any moral uncertainty default to minimizing existential risk, Bostrom 12[[20]](#footnote-18)

These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest[s]** **a**n alternative, complementary **way of looking at** existential **risk**; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate. Our present understanding of axiology might well be confused. We may not now know — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet be able to imagine the best ends of our journey. If we are indeed profoundly uncertain about our ultimate aims, then **we should recognize that there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value** and to steer the future accordingly. Ensuring that there will be a future version of humanity with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely is plausibly the best way available to us to increase the probability that the future will contain a lot of value. To do this, **[thus] we must prevent any existential catastrophe.**

#### Part Three is Burdens: The role of the ballot is to endorse the debater who forwards the best post fiat policy: The Neg Burden is to win offence to a competitive post fiat policy or the status quo. First, Comparing worlds is key to fairness and real world education. Nelson 8[[21]](#footnote-19)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution. If the negative need only prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to deny our ability to make truth-statements or to prove normative morality does not exist or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, such strategies seem fundamentally unfair, as **they provide the neg**ative **with** **functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole. Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. **By making the issue one of** desirability of **competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way. **Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces** both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer their worldview, thereby further enforcing **a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world**. They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

#### Second, Abstract movements won’t produce political results besides violence – embrace the hard work of pragmatic reform. Condit 15[[22]](#footnote-20)

Thus, when Žižek and others urge us to “Act” with violence to destroy the current Reality, without a vision of an alternative, on the grounds that the links between actions and consequences are never certain, we can call his appeal both a failure of imagination and a failure of reality. As for reality, we have dozens of revolutions as models, and the historical record indicates quite clearly that they generally lead not to harmonious cooperation (what I call “AnarchoNiceness” to gently mock the romanticism of Hardt and Negri) but instead to the production of totalitarian states and/or violent factional strife. A materialist constructivist epistemology accounts for this by predicting that it is not possible for symbol-using animals to exist in a symbolic void. All symbolic movement has a trajectory, and if you have not imagined a potentially realizable alternative for that trajectory to take, then what people will leap into is biological predispositions—the first iteration of which is the rule of the strongest primate. Indeed, this is what experience with revolutions has shown to be the most probable outcome of a revolution that is merely against an Evil. The failure of imagination in such rhetorics thereby reveals itself to be critical, so it is worth pondering sources of that failure. The rhetoric of “the kill” in social theory in the past half century has repeatedly reduced to the leap into a void because the symbolized alternative that the context of the twentieth century otherwise predispositionally offers is to the binary opposite of capitalism, i.e., communism. That rhetorical option, however, has been foreclosed by the historical discrediting of the readily imagined forms of communism (e.g., Žižek9). The hard work to invent better alternatives is not as dramatically enticing as the story of the kill: such labor is piecemeal, intellectually difficult, requires multi-disciplinary understandings, and perhaps requires more creativity than the typical academic theorist can muster. In the absence of a viable alternative, the appeals to Radical Revolution seem to have been sustained by the emotional zing of the kill, in many cases amped up by the appeal of autonomy and manliness (Žižek uses the former term and deploys the ethos of the latter). But if one does not provide a viable vision that offers a reasonable chance of leaving most people better off than they are now, then Fox News has a better offering (you'll be free and you'll get rich!). A revolution posited as a void cannot succeed as a horizon of history, other than as constant local scale violent actions, perhaps connected by shifting networks we call “terrorists.” This analysis of the geo-political situation, of the onto-epistemological character of language, and of the limitations of the dominant horizon of social change indicates that the focal project for progressive Left Academics should now include the hard labor to produce alternative visions that appear materially feasible.

#### Third, Role-playing as the government is key to real world education. Joyner ‘99[[23]](#footnote-21)

**Use of** the **debate can be an effective pedagogical tool** for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other **role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives** on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of **developing policy alternatives and experiencing** the **consequences** of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. [\*386] By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format **gives students** the **benefits** ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it **makes them** become **actively engaged** with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, **students become legal advocates**, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they **gain greater insight into** the **real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers**. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they **realize the complexities of applying and implementing** international **law**, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to **become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States** foreign **policy agenda** and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The **debate** thus **becomes an excellent vehicle for** pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the **real world** of **policy analysis**, political critique, **and legal defense.**

1. – Julia E., Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies @ the Council on Foreign Relations, “A Strategy to Reduce Gun Trafficking and Violence in the Americas” <http://www.cfr.org/arms-industries-and-trade/strategy-reduce-gun-trafficking-violence-americas/p31155> LK [↑](#footnote-ref--1)
2. Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Remaking the Relationship: The United States and Latin America,” April, IAD Policy Report, <http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf> LK [↑](#footnote-ref-0)
3. Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-214 LK [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
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